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Allowing Utilities to Compete in the Distributed 
Energy Resources Market: A Comparative Analysis 
Jennifer A. Neuhauser∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Beginning with the adoption of the nation’s first net metering law 
in 1981, the state of Minnesota has proactively sought policies and 
programs to encourage the development of renewable energy.1 Part of 
this initiative includes a legislative mandate requiring incumbent 
utilities to produce 27.5% of their electricity from renewable sources 
by 2025, as well as reducing electricity sales every year by the 
equivalent of 1.5% of their revenues.2 Yet, in spite of strong popular 
and legislative support in developing renewable energy resources, 
Minnesota continues to spend more than $1 billion every year 
importing fossil fuels, which generate almost 90% of its energy.3 
One method of encouraging wider adoption of renewable energy 
sources is to foster competition and innovation in the distributed 
energy resources (DER)/distributed generation (DG) market. 
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 1. MINN. STAT. § 216B.164 (2003) (requiring net metering for qualifying 
facilities less than 40 kW; requiring purchase of all energy and capacity at 
avoided cost for all facilities more than 40 kW). Net metering is “a billing 
arrangement that allows customers to receive compensation for unused 
electricity that they send back to the utility grid.” BILL GRANT & LISE TRUDEAU, 
MINNESOTA DISTRIBUTED GENERATION AND NET METERING 13 (2012). 
 2. MINN. STAT. § 216B.1691 (2008). 
 3. Linda Taylor, Clean Energy: Minnesota’s Legacy and Economic Future  
1 (Feb. 2012), http://fresh-energy.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Fact- 
sheet_RES.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/WX5M-FZ9L. 
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Generally speaking, distributed generation is on-site power 
generation “designed to meet local needs.”4 Distributed energy 
resource systems enhance or provide backup to traditional electric 
power systems. Usually DG requires connection to the commercial 
power grid due to the intermittent nature of its fuel source: the sun 
doesn’t always shine, and the wind doesn’t always blow.5 Because 
of its reliance on the commercial grid, incumbent utilities can 
significantly influence how quickly DG is adopted. Nonetheless, 
recent years have seen increased incumbent utility efforts to frustrate 
the growth of DG—particularly in Arizona, California, and 
Hawaii—because many utilities see DG initiatives as threatening 
potential sources of revenue, as well as imperiling grid stability and 
reliability.6 This article argues that rather than fighting against third 
party efforts to expand DG, incumbent utilities in Minnesota should 
embrace its inevitable widespread adoption by competing in the DG 
market. This article examines the possible policy and practical 
implications of fostering a competitive DER market in Minnesota 
with incumbent utilities and third parties competing to offer DER 
products and services. Lastly, this article demonstrates why allowing 
incumbent utilities to directly compete against third parties in 
DG/DER, if done in a thoughtful, deliberate manner with 
accompanying regulation to mitigate unfair advantages, is the best 
path forward for Minnesota utility consumers. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Throughout much of the twentieth century, the generation, 
transmission, and distribution of electrical power was considered 
to be a “natural monopoly” with service by more than one electric 
utility considered both uneconomical and duplicative.7 Usually the 
                                                                                                             
 4. GRANT & TRUDEAU, supra note 1, at 9. MINN. STAT. § 216B.164 (2013) 
(defining “distributed generation” as means a facility that: (1) has a capacity of 
ten megawatts or less; (2) is interconnected with a utility’s distribution system, 
over which the commission has jurisdiction; and (3) generates electricity from 
natural gas, renewable fuel, or a similarly clean fuel, and may include waste 
heat, cogeneration, or fuel cell technology.). 
 5. Though DG can also include combined heat and power systems (which 
capture and utilize waste heat) or natural gas-fired generators, this paper will 
mainly concentrate on renewable sources. In this paper DG and DER will be 
used interchangeably. 
 6. See generally Mark Chediak, et al., Utilities Feeling Rooftop Solar Heat 
Start Fighting Back, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 26, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com 
/news/2013-12-26/utilities-feeling-rooftop-solar-heat-start-fighting-back.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/N38H-CUWG. 
 7. See Jim Rossi, Universal Service in Competitive Retail Electric Power 
Market: Whither the Duty to Serve?, 21 ENERGY L.J. 27–29 (2000). Under the 
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natural monopoly of electrical service provision was vertically 
integrated, with a single company providing generation, transmission, 
and distribution of electrical power.8 Under this model, the utility 
assumes a duty to serve customers in a geographical area and accepts 
the obligation to interconnect and extend service per request in 
exchange for exclusivity, expected recovery of costs, and a reasonable 
rate of return.9 Consequently, investment in electrical utilities is 
traditionally considered “a safe, but unimaginative” venture, with an 
emphasis on low risk in exchange for small, but reliable returns.10 
As electricity use spread throughout the United States, utility 
companies built ever-larger power plants to meet the additional 
demand. Increased demand required larger power plants, which in 
turn increased performance and reduced production costs.11 Such 
growth also meant more customers increasing the utility rate base 
and lowering costs for all by increasing efficiency.12 This model 
worked well until the energy crises of the 1970s prompted 
policymakers to re-examine the natural monopoly model.13 
Beginning with the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 
(PURPA), Congress enacted several provisions to move utilities 
away from the vertically integrated single-provider structure in 
place since the 1930s.14 PURPA required incumbent utilities to 
purchase excess power generated by so-called “qualifying facilities” 
(QFs) at their “avoided cost,” which is the price the utility would 
                                                                                                             
 
theory of natural monopoly, the most economical way to serve a market demand 
in a natural monopoly is by a single firm. See generally, WILLIAM W. SHARKEY, 
THE THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY vii–27 (1982). 
 8. See AMORY LOVINS & ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., REINVENTING FIRE: 
BOLD BUSINESS SOLUTIONS FOR THE NEW ENERGY ERA 172 (2011). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. DEP’T OF ENERGY, A PRIMER ON ELECTRIC UTILITIES, DEREGULATION, 
AND RESTRUCTURING OF U.S. ELECTRICITY MARKETS 6.1 (2002). 
 12. See id. 
 13. See Jeffery S. Dennis, Twenty-Five Years of Electricity Law, Policy, and 
Regulation: a Look Back, 25 NATURAL RES. & ENV’T. 33, 34 (Summer 2010). In 
a PowerPoint presentation accompanying the article the author notes,“The Oil 
Embargo of the 1970s changed things in a hurry. Rapid increases in the cost of 
fuel to operate power plants translated into equally large jumps in retail power 
prices. Continued increases in oil prices and unstable fuel supplies led electric 
utilities to construct new power plants that relied on domestic coal and uranium. 
These plants cost much more to build than simple oil or natural gas-fired 
generators. Consequently, the fixed costs of utility operations increased, further 
increasing retail electricity prices. The natural consequence was consumer 
complaints and increased regulatory oversight.” 
 14. Id. at 34. 
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pay to acquire the power from an alternative source.15 With its 
departure from the traditional regulatory model and vertically 
integrated structure, PURPA encouraged the development of 
alternative sources of power, including cogeneration and small 
power production facilities.16 Furthermore, §210(e) of PURPA 
exempted QFs from most state and federal utility regulations, 
bolstering the development of Independent Power Producers (IPPs) 
who owned generation resources outside of those owned by the 
incumbent utilities.17 Prior to 2005, utility ownership of QFs was 
restricted to 50% to assure participation by third parties.18 
The passage of PURPA marked both an initial departure from 
the regulated monopoly model and a greater reliance on market 
forces to set wholesale energy prices. PURPA was followed by the 
Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPACT 1992), which was designed to 
“further development of IPPs and competition in wholesale electric 
markets” by allowing the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) to order utilities to provide transmission service to outside 
providers generating electric energy for wholesale sale.19 FERC 
ruled on specific transmission requests on a case-by case basis, 
which meant that the impact of the new law was limited to those 
entities seeking transmission service.20 Though competition 
increased, incumbent utilities routinely favored their own utility-
owned generators in the interconnection process, while creating 
barriers to other parties such as refusing to grant easements across 
utility properties.21 During the 1990s, FERC abandoned their case-
by-case approach by promulgating FERC Order No. 888, requiring 
each utility that owns, operates, or controls transmission 
facilities to provide open and nondiscriminatory transmission 
service to others on the same basis as the utility provided 
for its own needs….Further, the regulations required 
                                                                                                             
 15. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, § 210, 
92 Stat. 3144 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (2011)) [hereinafter 
PURPA]. A “qualifying facility” is a renewable energy or cogeneration facility 
that meets FERC standards that qualify it for a myriad of regulatory and financial 
incentives. As enacted in 1978, it included the mandatory purchase of excess 
power by incumbent facilities. As amended in 2005, utilities that are able to 
demonstrate that the QFs in their service areas have competitive options, may be 
exempted from the purchase mandate. 
 16. Id. See also Dennis, supra note 13. 
 17. PURPA, supra note 15, at § 210(e). 
 18. ROBERT E. BURNS & KENNETH ROSE, PURPA TITLE II COMPLIANCE 
MANUAL 8 (2014). 
 19. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-468, 106 Stat. 2776. 
 20. See id. 
 21. JAMES BRODER ET. AL., THE MILLENNIAL REVOLUTION IN ELECTRIC 
TRANSMISSION: FROM MONOPOLY TO THE MARKETPLACE 12 (2014). 
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‘functional unbundling’; that is, utilities were required to 
separate the transmission portion of their services from 
their generation and power marketing functions, and to 
state separate rates for each such service.22 
PURPA, EPACT 1992, and FERC Order No. 888 reflected a 
wider trend of opening wholesale markets to competition as well as 
a push by the federal government to diversify the energy market 
through the presence of IPPs. The success of IPPs in wholesale 
markets demonstrated the feasibility of a non-vertically integrated 
model.23 Similar changes occurred at the retail level, with several 
states pursuing competitive markets for the retail supply of electric 
power while simultaneously seeking supply through alternative 
resources and distributed generation.24 
Today, there are two broad models at the retail level: the 
vertically integrated utility and the retail choice model. Under the 
vertically integrated utility model, transmission and distribution 
services are provided by a single entity with prices set by the 
regulatory authority.25 Conversely, the retail choice model allows 
consumers to select their energy provider with the utility providing 
delivery.26 The retail choice model requires the utility’s delivery 
charges to be set by the regulatory authority, while the non-utility 
provider sets its own pricing for generation.27 Generation services 
in the retail choice model can be provided by either a competitive 
provider or by a “provider of last resort.”28 
The history of deregulation at both the wholesale and retail levels 
is relevant to the issue of allowing utilities to compete in DER 
services for several reasons. First of all, the transition to deregulation 
demonstrates the natural tendency of an entrenched monopoly, such 
as a vertically integrated utility, to keep the status quo and resist 
competition consistent with the existing regulatory structure and its 
duties to shareholders. Second, the opening of the market to wider 
competition forced utilities to contemplate a different way of doing 
business once they realized change was inevitable. Third, regardless 
of the activities of newcomers, incumbent utilities still play a large 
role in influencing the market due to their access to customers, 
                                                                                                             
 22. Dennis, supra note 13, at 36. 
 23. BRODER, supra note 21, at 13. 
 24. See NAVIGANT, EVOLUTION OF THE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY STRUCTURE IN 
THE U.S. AND RESULTING ISSUES ii (2013). 
 25. Id. at iii. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at iv. 
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familiarity with existing structures, and need to plan and provide 
service as part of the regulatory compact. 
One example of an innovation caused by deregulation is the 
expansion of environmentally friendly offerings by utilities. In their 
paper “Deregulation and Environmental Differentiation in the Electric 
Utility Industry,” authors Magali Delmas, Michael Russo, and Maria 
Montes-Sancho argue that deregulation and the fungibility of the 
kilowatt-hour forced incumbent utilities to differentiate themselves by 
offering more green power.29 The authors assert prior to deregulation, 
utilities catered to three broad classes of customer: industrial, 
commercial, and residential. Because of their position as a monopoly, 
utilities had “little incentive to think further about how customers 
differed within each of these customer classes.”30 Even if there was a 
demand within these classes for green power, prior to deregulation 
there was little incentive for incumbent utilities to offer consumers 
choices.31 The authors also point out that traditionally utilities 
aggregated costs from all types of generation and 
apportioned them to kilowatt-hour prices. Under this regime 
. . . creating a green power product by pulling out just the 
costs associated with those plants represented not only a 
substantial shift in accounting practice, but, equally, a 
profound regulatory challenge. These factors worked 
together to keep potential ‘green customers’ out of the 
picture prior to retail deregulation.32 
With the arrival of deregulation, incumbent utilities were forced 
to innovate in order to respond to competitive threats in the 
marketplace. Previously suppressed customer classes, such as the 
‘green’ customer, emerged as the historical accounting practices and 
lack of innovation fell by the wayside. Though incumbent utilities 
may resist change created by the proliferation of competition-
enhancing policies and legislation, eventually they concede the 
inevitable and embrace competition, adapting in ways that are 
advantageous to the ordinary consumer. The evolution of utilities in 
the face of enhanced competition offers useful lessons for the future 
of distributed generation because it demonstrates that competition 
combined with appropriate incentive drives innovation. 
                                                                                                             
 29. See Magali Delmas, et al., Deregulation and Environmental Differentiation 
in the Electric Utility Industry, 28 STRAT. MGMT. J. 189, 192 (2007). 
 30. Id. at 193. 
 31. See id. 
 32. Id. 
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II. DISTRIBUTED GENERATION 
Though the terms “distributed generation” and “distributed 
energy resources” may be unfamiliar to most Americans, DG and 
DER actually pre-date the centralized, gigawatt-scale power plants 
and high-voltage transmission lines that are the hallmark of modern 
life in America.33 Even as central power generation evolved, many 
consumers, such as hospitals, telecommunication sites, and the 
military, found it advantageous to have on-site power generation as 
backup, usually in the form of diesel generators.34 Unfortunately, the 
use of diesel generators for back-up power is an imperfect solution 
in the event of a prolonged blackout: “Diesel generators are not 
designed to run for weeks at a time, and fuel storage capacities vary 
widely. Additionally, the preventive maintenance for these diesel 
generators does not always prepare the generators for 100% 
availability; they have a low probability of 60% to start when 
needed.”35 Another commenter adds, “Backup generators are filthy, 
wasteful, and prone to performance problems depending on the 
frequency and duration of grid outages.”36 
Though today’s rooftop solar DG systems are cleaner and 
ultimately cheaper in the long run than diesel generators, they still 
require connection to the commercial power grid due to variability 
in their energy supply. However, advancements in battery and 
storage technology presage that the ability to operate independently 
from the grid may only be a few years away; Edison Electrical 
Institute imagines a future where “efficient energy storage combined 
with distributed generation could create the ultimate risk to grid 
viability.”37 Today, the military is investing heavily in technologies 
coupling DG with renewable energy and advanced storage, 
allowing the Department of Defense (DOD) to potentially operate 
independently of the commercial power grid in the event of a 
                                                                                                             
 33. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF DISTRIBUTED 
GENERATION AND RATE-RELATED ISSUES THAT MAY IMPEDE THEIR EXPANSION 
i (2007) [hereafter BENEFITS OF DG]. 
 34. See id. 
 35. JUANIA GIRALDEZ ET AL., NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY, 
VALUING ENERGY SECURITY: CUSTOMER DAMAGE FUNCTION METHODOLOGY AND 
CASE STUDIES AT DOD INSTALLATIONS 2 (2012). 
 36. William Pentland, Backup Generators Are the Bad and Ugly of 
Decentralized Energy, FORBES (Apr. 13, 2013, 12:52 PM), http://www.forbes.com 
/sites/williampentland/2013/04/15/backup-generators-are-the-bad-and-ugly-of 
decentralized-energy/, archived at http://perma.cc/L3RQ-F2BG. 
 37. PETER KIND, EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, DISRUPTIVE CHALLENGES: 
FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO A CHANGING RETAIL 
ELECTRIC BUSINESS 3 (2013). 
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major disaster or national emergency.38 This technology will both 
enhance energy security and reduce fuel costs.39 
Along with its future potential to act as a reliable backup power 
source or possible displacement of the commercial grid, DG 
presently offers many benefits to consumers and utilities alike. For 
example, a study conducted by Southern California Edison found 
that adding DG to the grid system reduces peak demand, thereby 
deferring necessary upgrades in circuit capacity.40 DG also 
improves the efficiency of the transmission and distribution (T&D) 
network by replacing power generation from central facilities with 
demand-side reactive power resources, which also “frees up useful 
T&D system capacity for additional real power transfers from 
generation sources to loads.”41 Using DG to provide reactive 
power on-site also reduces both distribution line losses and 
transmission line losses, improving the overall capabilities of the 
T&D system.42 In fact, one study found: 
Distribution losses are the largest percentage of total system 
losses, comprising about 27% of total losses. When reactive 
power is supplied from a Distributed Energy Resource 
(DER) such as a microturbine, losses on the distribution 
feeder can be reduced or even eliminated. Local power 
quality can also be significantly improved.43 
Overall, DG installations can defer T&D upgrades and 
renewable DG provides environmental benefits that both benefit 
society as a whole and enable utilities to meet legislative 
mandates.44 DG can also improve overall power quality and grid 
security. Furthermore, some DG, such as rooftop solar installations, 
helps utilities avoid contentious eminent domain battles when 
planning for system expansions and upgrades, thereby improving 
relations with the local community.45 
                                                                                                             
 38. S.V.T. NGUYIN, ET. AL., MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, 
MICROGRID STUDY: ENERGY SECURITY FOR DOD INSTALLATIONS iii (2012). 
 39. Issue: Military Microgrids, NEMA, http://www.nema.org/Policy 
/Documents/Military%20Microgrids.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5U8K- 
LSBR(last visited Jan. 20, 2015). 
 40. BENEFITS OF DG, supra note 33, at 3-4. 
 41. Id. at 4-2. 
 42. Id. 
 43. J.D. Kueck, et al. Voltage Regulation: Tapping Distributed Energy 
Resources, PUB. UTILS. FORTNIGHTLY, Sept. 2004, at 46. 
 44. L. BIRD ET. AL., NATIONAL RENEWABLES ENERGY LABORATORY, 
REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS OF DISTRIBUTED GENERATION 11 (2013). 
 45. JOHN FARRELL, INSTITUTE FOR LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE, THE POLITICAL 
AND TECHNICAL ADVANTAGES OF DISTRIBUTED GENERATION 17 (2011). 
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However, the rise of DG is not entirely good news for the 
incumbent utilities. Reliable power requires both predictability and 
flexibility in the generation, transmission, and distribution of 
electricity, which is easier to provide with centralized management 
and planning of energy resources.46 With the growth of DG systems, 
customer-owned generation may be outside the utility’s control, 
largely unmonitored, and therefore unavailable to regulate the 
balance of energy supply and demand.47 Furthermore, DG power 
production may not correspond to peak electricity demand, and 
areas with high penetration of DG production may actually require 
additional investment in infrastructure to handle excess energy 
supply.48 Many utilities argue the revenue generated from customers 
with DG assets does not offset the costs to act as standby power for 
those customers, leading to issues of fairness and cost allocation—
while some customers reduce their individual energy costs through 
self-generation, part of their share of distribution costs are shifted to 
non-DG customers.49 Utility companies are powerless to refuse 
service to DG customers, as current law mandates utilities provide 
access to the grid for all customers regardless of whether it is being 
used for power delivery or merely for backup.50 This problem is 
exacerbated by the fact that consumers with fewer resources are less 
likely to have access to DER.51 
Many in the electric utility industry have termed the rise of 
DG/DER as an “existential threat” to the livelihood of incumbent 
utilities.52 Steven Corneli, Senior Vice President of Policy, Strategy, 
and Sustainability at NRG Energy notes the expansion of DER is 
“increasingly eroding the volumetric sales of electricity by utilities, 
leaving utilities with fewer kWh and kW of sales over which to 
                                                                                                             
 46. JAMES NEWCOMB ET. AL., ROCKY MOUNTAIN INSTITUTE, NEW BUSINESS 
MODELS FOR THE DISTRIBUTION EDGE: THE TRANSITION FROM VALUE CHAIN TO 
VALUE CONSTELLATION 7 (2013) [hereafter NEW BUSINESS MODELS]. 
 47. Jeff St. John, Hawaii’s Solar Grid Landscape and the Nessie Curve, 
GREEN TECH SOLAR (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles 
/read/hawaiis-solar-grid-landscape-and-the-nessie-curve, archived at http://perma 
.cc/V8MR-ZVPG. 
 48. NEW BUSINESS MODELS, supra note 46, at 17. 
 49. John Slocum, Threat from Behind the Meter: The Case for Utilities to 
Compete Directly with Distributed Resources, PUB. UTILS. FORTNIGHTLY, July 
2013, at 49–50. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Richard Martin, Distributed Generation Poses Existential Threat to 
Utilities, FORBES.COM, (Aug. 26, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/pikeresearch 
/2013/08/26/distributed-generation-poses-existential-threat-to-utilities/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/2AK6-3GZX. 
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spread their fixed and operating costs.”53 DER technologies are 
growing demonstrably cheaper: Between 2008 and 2012, the cost of 
photovoltaic (PV) panels dropped from $3.80/watt to $.86/watt.54 At 
the same time, much of the infrastructure utilities rely on requires 
upgrading or replacement; it is projected that the United States. 
electric power structure could require $3.5 trillion over the next 40 
years to replace aging infrastructure.55 Upgrades to existing facilities 
and infrastructure due to age, security needs, reliability issues, or 
environmental standards increase fixed costs to utilities, which pass 
these costs along to their customers.56 Since 2002, annual spending 
per customer on routine tasks such as maintenance and distribution 
equipment has increased at roughly twice the rate of inflation.57 
Additionally, DG/DER contributes to stranded costs, which occur 
when the incumbent utility invests in infrastructure that becomes 
redundant in a competitive environment.58 Oftentimes utilities will 
seek to recover stranded costs by charging their customers a stranded 
cost recovery fee, further increasing rates among its remaining 
ratepayers.59 
Meanwhile, incumbent utilities are experiencing flat or falling 
demand due to phenomenon such as demand saturation and 
increasingly efficient appliances.60 Demand saturation occurs when 
“consumers in rich countries can afford and already use as much of 
the basic commodities and services they need and want…when 
consumers reach high per capital levels of consumption, be it pasta, 
soda, miles driven, or electricity, there is little or no gain from 
consuming more.”61 Additionally, federal and state governments 
continue to support policies such as the Solar Investment Tax Credit, 
which provides a 30% tax credit for solar systems on residential and 
commercial properties, as well as energy efficiency and power 
                                                                                                             
 53. Slocum, supra note 49. NRG Energy is a wholesale energy company 
based in Princeton, New Jersey. 
 54. Richard Read, Will Solar Panels Destroy Electric Utilities’ Business 
Model? Yes, They Say, GREENCARREPORTS (May 31, 2013), http://www.green 
carreports.com/news/1084508_will-solar-panels-destroy-electric-utilities-business-
model-yes-they-say, archived at http://perma.cc/BZU6-J4SA. 
 55. LOVINS, supra note 8, at 166. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Slocum, supra note 49, at 48. 
 58. JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, ENERGY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 198–99 (2011). 
 59. Minnesota does not currently have a stranded cost recovery fee. See 
Minnesota, ENERGY & ENVTL. ANALYSIS, INC., http://www.eea-inc.com/rrdb 
/DGRegProject/States/Newsite/MNrevised.html, archived at http://perma.cc/E2Q7-
UBWN. 
 60. FEREIDOON P. SIOSHANSI, DISTRIBUTED GENERATION AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UTILITY INDUSTRY 56 (2013). 
 61. Id. at 61. 
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conservation programs.62 Furthermore, net metering and feed-in 
tariffs require utilities to buy distributed renewable energy at “parity 
with retail rates rather than the wholesale cost of power.”63 These 
factors combine to create a feedback loop of ever-increasing 
regulated utility rates while simultaneously many of the costs of 
alternatives such as DER are falling, leading even more customers 
producing electricity on-site and further accelerating loss of sales to 
DER.64 
Therefore, the rate of DER penetration continues to raise 
concerns. Though Minnesota solar energy supporters proposed 
legislation mandating the state’s power companies get ten percent of 
their electricity from solar resources by 2030, eventually the bill was 
watered down to a non-mandatory goal.65 Even so, the state’s two 
largest electric companies, Xcel Energy and Great River Energy, 
opposed the measure, claiming it would increase customer rates by up 
to 1.3%.66 “Markets, not mandates, should drive energy 
development,” added Cris Oehler, a spokeswoman for Otter Tail 
Power Company of Fergus Falls, Minnesota.67 
In spite of proclamations of an impending “utility death spiral,” 
many analysts, including famed investor Warren Buffett, insist 
such talk is premature. 68 The American Council for an Energy 
Efficient Economy (ACEEE) calculates even with the rapid growth 
of DG and increases in energy efficiency initiatives, energy 
consumption will decrease only ten percent in the next 25 to 30 
years.69 Furthermore, there are some places where it is impossible, 
either due to geography or the nature of the dwelling, for 
                                                                                                             
 62. Solar Investment Tax Credit, SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N., http://www 
.seia.org/policy/finance-tax/solar-investment-tax-credit, archived at http://perma.cc 
/PJ8B-BBJV?type=live. 
 63. Slocum, supra note 49, at 49. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Dan Haugen, Minnesota’s New Solar Law: Looking Beyond Percentages, 
MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS (May 24, 2013), http://www.midwestenergynews.com 
/2013/05/24/minnesotas-new-solar-law-looking-beyond-percentages/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/H2RV-CMAL. 
 66. David Shaffer, Minnesota Solar Industry Pushes for Utility Mandate, STAR 
TRIBUNE (Feb. 20, 2013), http://www.startribune.com/business/192130991.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/S7Z3-M4PQ. 
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consumers to stop using grid-provided electricity—an example 
being high-rise apartment buildings in densely populated urban 
centers with little solar exposure.70 
Though complete obsolescence of the grid may not come any 
time soon, utilities still must deal with the real and present danger 
of erosion of their stock value.71 For example, many experts 
predict advancing storage and generation technologies, such as 
those researched by the military, may one day allow ordinary 
consumers to completely disconnect from the grid; the Edison 
Electric Institute, a utility trade organization, admits: 
Due to the variable nature of renewable DER, there is a 
perception that customers will always need to remain on 
the grid. While we would expect customers to remain on 
the grid until a fully viable and economic distributed non-
variable resource is available, one can imagine a day when 
battery storage technology or micro turbines could allow 
customers to be electric grid independent.72 
Shane Kann, Senior Vice President of GTWM Research notes, 
“Utilities operate on a long time horizon, and concerns about grid 
defection should be creeping toward the forefront of utilities’ 
minds now.”73 
In response to perceived attacks on their business model by 
DG, concerns over grid stability and reliability, and unfairness to 
non-solar consumers, many utilities have gone on the offense. In 
2013, Arizona Public Service (APS) proposed an $8.00/kW charge 
to solar customers, arguing it was necessary in order to avoid 
shifting infrastructure costs to non-solar customers.74 This proposal 
coincided with the exponential growth of rooftop solar installations 
in Arizona caused by new leasing programs that allowed 
construction at little to no upfront cost—between June 2009 and 
June 2013 rooftop solar systems in APS’s service area increased 
from approximately 900 to 18,000 systems.75 Rather than accepting 
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the $8.00/kW charge, or even the $3.00/kW charge proposed by 
Arizona’s Ratepayer Advocate, the Arizona Corporation Commission 
voted to charge $0.70/kW to rooftop solar owners to help offset 
revenue losses.76 In April 2014, APS supported a property tax on 
customers leasing solar panels in Arizona, an estimated 85% of new 
solar customers.77 
Arizona is not the only state dealing with DG issues. In 
September 2013, Hawaiian Electric Company (HECO) told solar 
contractors and residents on the island of Oahu they would need 
permission to connect rooftop solar systems to the island’s power 
grid.78 The penetration of rooftop solar in Oahu is ten percent, 
compared with California’s rate of two to three percent.79 Due to its 
dependency on imported petroleum for 70% of its electricity 
generation, Hawaii has the highest energy costs in the nation.80 
HECO argued the unprecedented jump in solar installations caused a 
situation where PV panels created more power than was consumed, 
thereby creating “overvoltage” which can flow back to substations, 
leading to reliability and surge problems.81 HECO also said that 
overvoltage could create safety issues for their utility crews working 
in the area.82 
Waiting for HECO approval caused substantial delays and 
frustration for new rooftop solar consumers, particularly those who 
were simultaneously paying high energy bills and loan payments 
on solar installations while their PV panels sat idle. In May 2014, 
the Hawaii Public Utilities Commission (HPUC) found HECO was 
not responding to customer demand fast enough, and ordered the 
utility to come up with a “core comprehensive strategy that can 
lower costs and help connect more PV systems to the grid.”83 
The responses of HECO and APS are but one of many 
reactions incumbent utilities can have to DG growth. The next 
section will examine two broad modalities of these responses: 1) 
ratemaking measures to mitigate costs associated with DG expansion 
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and equalize the burden appropriately between DG and non-DG 
customers and 2) alternative utility and regulatory structures designed 
to enable incumbent utilities to compete with outside entrants.84 
III. RESPONSE TO GROWTH IN DISTRIBUTED GENERATION 
Existing regulatory and rate-recovery mechanisms can create 
disincentives for customer-owned DG. The Edison Institute 
advocates “revis[ing] utility tariff structures in order to eliminate 
cross subsidies (by non-DER participants) and investor cost-
recovery uncertainties.”85 It is reasonable to expect utilities and 
regulators to turn to the familiar mechanism of ratemaking to 
diminish the impact of DG entrants in the market.86 Many states, 
including Minnesota, rely on traditional cost-of-service ratemaking 
and volumetric pricing in order to allow utilities to recover their 
costs of service, with allowed rates of return on equity.87 Some 
utilities have argued linking a utility’s profits to the volume of 
electricity consumed creates disincentives for the utility to 
encourage energy efficiency while magnifying the harm for 
remaining non-DG customers when DG customers use less 
energy.88 
One method of addressing disincentives for energy conservation 
and renewable energy is “decoupling,” which can reduce lost 
revenues for shareholders as well as break the link between sales and 
profitability.89 Minnesota Statutes 216B.2412 defines decoupling as a 
“regulatory tool designed to separate a utility’s revenue from changes 
in energy sales. The purpose of decoupling is to reduce a utility’s 
disincentive to promote energy efficiency.”90 The same statute 
provides for the development of pilot programs to assess rate 
decoupling among rate-regulated utilities.91 
Another method to recover lost revenue is the imposition of 
backup/standby rates, interconnection charges, and universal access 
charges against DG users to ensure they pay a fair share of 
transmission and distribution costs that would otherwise be 
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subsidized by other users.92 Standby rates are often not effective 
because the actual costs incurred by the network vary according to 
time of day and location.93 Because of this uncertainty and lack of 
transparency, the 2013 Minnesota Omnibus Energy Bill amended 
Minnesota Statutes 216B.164 to prohibit standby charges for facilities 
smaller than 100 kW.94 
Other utilities have sought to reduce or eliminate incentives such 
as net metering, arguing they are no longer necessary as renewable 
energy costs and technology reach parity with nonrenewable 
resources. As of February 2014, 43 states and the District of 
Columbia had policies encouraging the rolling over of credits for 
excess electricity to future utility bills.95 Utilities contend DG 
customers receive more credit than the overall benefits they provide 
to the grid; rather than just receiving the cost of the power credited 
to their next month’s bill, customers with solar systems are credited 
at the full retail electricity rate, meaning the cost of the power, plus 
fixed costs such as poles, wires, meters, and other infrastructure.96 
According to the Edison Electric Institute, the average residential 
customer paying $110 a month for electricity is paying for $60 
worth of grid service; net-metered customers avoid paying these 
grid-related costs through rollover credits, thereby passing these 
costs on to other customers.97 In Kansas, for example, utilities 
supported legislation that would reduce the amount of money solar 
customers would receive from net metering.98 Similar battles have 
taken place in Arizona, North Carolina, California, and Colorado.99 
Regardless of whether such measures are for reasons of 
fairness and equity (as argued by utilities) or to preserve revenue 
(as argued by DG advocates), ratemaking responses inevitably 
have the effect of alienating the very customers the utilities are 
seeking to retain. Inevitably there will be accusations that the 
incumbent utility is seeking to “punish” DG users, regardless of 
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how justified or altruistic such measures may be.100 As the cases in 
Arizona and Hawaii demonstrate, efforts appearing to obstruct or 
hinder the expansion of renewable DER, largely seen by the public 
as a “good thing,” usually either fall far short of making the utility 
whole or fail outright while simultaneously turning public opinion 
against the utility. Even if such efforts are successful, they still do 
not address the underlying problem of losing revenue to DG/DER 
long term. 
Though some efforts of cost recovery such as standby fees are 
necessary, a better, more strategic approach to the threat of DG/DER 
is to change the traditional utility business model rather than sit idly 
by as revenue diminishes.101 As the Edison Electric Institute noted 
in its report on DG, “Participants in all industries must prepare for 
and develop plans to address disruptive threats, including plans to 
replace their own technology” with alternatives.102 “Ultimately, all 
stakeholders must embrace change in technology and business 
models in order to maintain a viable utility industry,” the report 
added.103 It appears some in the industry are listening: According to 
a recent Pricewaterhouse Coopers survey, rather than viewing DG as 
a “disruptive threat” 82% of utility executives view DG as an 
“opportunity.”104 
One justification for utilities to embrace DER, particularly DG 
solar, is the opportunity to enhance shareholder returns. Utilities need 
capital investments to ensure healthy returns for shareholders; private 
utilities invest in infrastructure and then charge customers enough to 
earn the investment back plus an authorized rate of return.105 Long-
term solar contracts between utilities and homeowners could 
guarantee a steady revenue stream for the length of the contract, 
typically up to 25 years.106 With the potential of a $6 billion market 
and just one percent penetration, rooftop solar is “just getting started” 
according to Kristian Hanelt, Senior Vice President of Renewable 
Capital Markets at Clean Power Finance.107 
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Increased adoption of DG would also drive down costs for 
incumbent ratepayers. Mr. Hanelt observes that out of 80 million 
detached single-family homes in the United States, 56 million 
would be able to save money by switching to rooftop solar.108 
Utility customers who adopt rooftop solar could use the monthly 
savings in their electricity bill to help pay for the system.109 Thus, 
utilities that fight, rather than embrace, the DER/DG market may 
be forgoing a potentially lucrative opportunity to participate. 
Additionally, due to their regulated monopoly status and their 
regular interactions with capital markets, utilities are able to raise 
capital at rates much lower than those obtained by non-utilities 
who invest in DER, thereby lowering overall costs to utility 
consumers.110 
Utilities must learn these lessons quickly; a failure to understand 
the paradigm shift wrought by renewable DER has already had real-
world consequences for utilities and their shareholders in other 
countries. In 2011, the main political parties in Germany agreed to an 
11 year phase-out of nuclear plants in the response to the Fukushima 
nuclear accident in Japan; additionally, the government set a target of 
cutting carbon emissions by 80 to 95% by 2050, with renewables 
supplying 80% of Germany’s electricity.111 In response to the policy, 
RWE, a German utility company, started burning more coal to keep 
up with demand while transitioning from nuclear power, and at the 
same time an unusually cold winter increased fossil fuel prices.112 In 
March 2014, RWE’s CEO, Peter Terium, admitted the company’s 
€2.8 billion loss, the first loss in 60 years, was largely attributable to a 
misguided focus on conventional fossil fuels over renewable and 
distributed energy.113 “We were late entering into the renewables 
market—possibly too late,” Terium said; rather than strategizing 
for the long run, RWE instead chose to meet immediate demands 
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and damn the consequences.114 Renewable energy comprises 31% of 
the German electricity sector,115 far exceeding that of the United 
States. Nonetheless, utilities in the United States can learn from 
RWE’s failures. After all, according to the National Renewable 
Energy Laboratory, renewable energy generation has the potential to 
supply 80% of total electricity generation in the United States by 
2050.116 
Overall, whether provided by third parties or the incumbent, 
increased use of DER would offer benefits to consumers and the 
environment and improve electricity production and delivery as a 
whole. Minnesota’s grid suffers significant outages due to blizzards 
and ice, floods, tornados, and wind storms, as well as equipment 
failure; the proliferation of DG would help mitigate and possibly 
prevent some of these outages, especially as storage and battery 
technologies improve.117 The issue of DER and the future of 
renewables in Minnesota takes on a pressing importance when 
considering that both of the state’s nuclear plants will retire in 2030 
and 2033 and 50% of Minnesota coal-fired power plants will be more 
than 40 years old by 2017.118 Such concerns, combined with a 
progressive stance towards renewable energy and DG in general, 
enabled the passage of DER friendly laws in Minnesota in 2013 and 
2014: Under recently passed legislation, investor-owned utilities in 
Minnesota must add an estimated 450 MW of solar power to their 
systems between 2013 and 2020, a tenth of which will need to come 
from small systems of up to 20 kW.119 
The prospect of the expansion of DER, as well as the potential 
resources and pivotal role incumbent utilities play in the management 
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of the commercial grid, indicate there is a role for them to play in 
the future of DER. Given the incumbent utility’s legal obligation to 
provide universal service in exchange for exclusive franchise 
rights,120 the question arises as to whether the benefits of allowing 
incumbents to directly compete with third parties for DER market 
share outweigh the potential costs, and what second- and third-order 
effects may arise from such an arrangement. The following 
paragraphs examine arguments for and against direct incumbent 
utility involvement in the DER market. 
IV. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST UTILITY INVOLVEMENT 
There are a number of arguments against allowing incumbent 
utilities to directly compete with third parties. A New York State 
Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) report on 
the subject states that “[electric] market structures are developed to 
prevent the exercise of undue market power over the price or 
availability of power by any market participant.”121 One issue cited 
by the NYSERDA report is the advantage of incumbent utility in 
terms of “access to information or the cost of information for pre-
development activities,” the most likely being information about 
current and future T&D relief needs.122 Many third-party installers 
argue that utilities with the advantages of name recognition, access 
to information, and low-cost capital, will dominate the market, 
driving many of their competitors to extinction. They argue it would 
be better to have the utility stay out of the market altogether, instead 
providing information and incentives targeted to third parties to 
promote growth in those areas most likely to benefit the grid as a 
whole. 
Conversely, the expertise and resources incumbent utilities 
bring to bear on the market can encourage rapid adoption of 
renewable DG, allowing it to gain a foothold in the market rather 
than remaining an outlier. Recent years have shown these assets 
can provide carbon-free generation, hedges against fuel price risk, 
deferment of transmission and distribution upgrades, and valuable 
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grid resiliency at a price comparable to non-DER resources.123 The 
faster DG is adopted the quicker these benefits can be realized. 
For their part, utilities argue unregulated third parties have a 
significant advantage over incumbents, who are both subject to state 
and federal regulations for safety and reliability as well as economic 
rate of return regulation by the Public Utilities Commission (PUC).124 
According to the regulatory compact, the incumbent is required to 
serve all customers located in an assigned service territory, including 
those DG owners who may be subsidized by other users, as well as 
low-income consumers.125 In addition, the incumbent must plan for 
all customer’s needs; the Integrated Resource Planning (IRP) process 
requires incumbent utilities to plan “to meet present and future 
customer demands by designing their generation mix to make 
reasonably priced electricity adequately available on a reliable 
basis.”126 Thus, the utility must be prepared to serve, even if a 
customer reduces or alters its usage through the use of DG without 
notice to the utility, or decides to abandon its DG investment and 
return to the grid. Additionally, rather than having the flexibility to 
adapt to the changing needs of the market, utilities must consult with 
and receive approval from the PUC before changing rate structures 
or offerings. As a result, incumbent utilities lack flexibility to react 
to market contingencies and business opportunities. Key decisions 
by incumbents must undergo a lengthy, and often contentious, 
review process using time, personnel, and resources. Third parties 
have no such constraints.  
Moreover, third parties continue to enjoy the advantages of net 
metering policies as well as grid backup, while imposing additional 
costs to the incumbent in the form of administrative and backup 
supply burdens due to the variable nature of renewable DER.127 
Though the incumbent must also provide backup power should it 
install its own renewable DER, such costs may be mitigated, 
planned for, shifted, and internalized. Third parties transfer risk to 
incumbent utilities if they use non-standard technologies unfamiliar 
to incumbent power engineers who still have the burden to ensure 
interconnected systems are safe and do not impose reliability 
issues.128 
Without utility involvement in the DG market, utilities are 
seeing the erosion of their customer base without any corresponding 
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compensation to make up for the loss. In the meantime, upkeep of 
generation, transmission, and distribution infrastructure must still be 
maintained for the benefit of both the DG and non-DG consumer 
alike. Allowing incumbent utilities to compete makes them active 
participants in the DG market, fostering enthusiasm for DG 
expansion that cannot be substituted for with regulatory mandates, 
while helping to maintain their financial health. 
Furthermore, direct participation in the DG market is consistent 
with utility obligations and can help ensure equity among 
consumers. Unlike private actors, public utilities hold a unique 
position in public life. Minnesota Statutes 216B.01 states: 
It is hereby declared to be in the public interest that public 
utilities be regulated as hereinafter provided in order to 
provide the retail consumers of natural gas and electric 
service in this state with adequate and reliable services at 
reasonable rates, consistent with the financial and economic 
requirements of public utilities and their need to construct 
facilities to provide such services or to otherwise obtain 
energy supplies, to avoid unnecessary duplication of 
facilities which increase the cost of service to the consumer 
and to minimize disputes between public utilities which 
may result in inconvenience or diminish efficiency in 
service to the consumers.129 
The statutory purpose of the public utility is to provide reliable 
electricity at a reasonable cost. The overarching goal as established 
by the Minnesota Legislature is not competition or profitability, 
but rather reliability and affordability. Both of these goals can be 
achieved through the rapid expansion of DER facilitated by the 
incumbent’s participation in the market. 
Currently, those residential customers purchasing or leasing solar 
installations tend to be wealthier than the average electrical consumer: 
Between complicated local permitting requirements (costing up to 
$2,000 in some cities), owning a residence that allows for such 
installations (i.e. a house versus an apartment), having sufficient 
taxable assets to take advantage of incentives provided by the federal 
and state governments, or even having good enough credit to secure a 
lease, there are significant obstacles for lower income consumers.130 
If the goal is to promote the expansion of renewable DG beyond 
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those who already have the ability to use it (i.e. the wealthy), the 
utility offers advantages over third party providers. First of all, 
many third party providers may be uninterested in extending 
service in lower income areas, even with incentives provided by 
the utility. Conversely, regardless of consumer wealth, the utility 
still has the obligation to act as the provider of last resort, and 
providing DG in those areas may lower overall costs for the utility, 
and ultimately, to its ratepayers. 
Additionally, many consumers may not want the hassle of dealing 
with competing providers. As one writer observed: 
Call me a lousy consumer, or maybe just a lazy one, but I 
don’t want choices when it comes to my energy supplier…I 
do not feel qualified or knowledgeable enough to weigh the 
many options out there, and it made my head hurt to 
contemplate trying to do that for myself.131 
Research conducted during the deregulation of the electricity 
market in some states has shown consumers 
have difficulty evaluating the barrage of advertising and 
marketing material associated with customer choice, are 
concerned about the reliability of their new provider, and 
expect exaggerated or misleading advertising claims by 
green power marketers. Not surprisingly, many consumers 
exposed to competitive electricity markets simply find 
choice overwhelming and, as a result, find it easier to do 
nothing.132 
Inertia on part of the consumer can result in a situation in 
which the electric system could benefit from DG, but the market 
fails to provide it. In this instance it is the utility, having the 
obligation to provide power while making the system work, that 
has the incentive to intervene and place DG as part of that system. 
In such instances, the market is better with the incumbent-utility 
competitor than without it. 
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V. INCUMBENT UTILITIES IN COMPETITIVE MARKETS  
Many of the arguments for and against incumbent participation 
in DER expansion are being played out in Arizona. In July of 2013, 
APS, the incumbent utility provider, argued before the Arizona 
Corporation Commission (ACC) that in addition to unfair net 
metering policies shifting costs to non-DG customers, “[a]dditional 
benefits claimed from rooftop solar, such as long-term fuel hedging, 
impacts on national and regional commodity prices, employment 
benefits from solar jobs and compliance costs for the renewable 
portfolio standard are either double-counting, spurious, unproven or 
all three.”133 A month later, APS complained bitterly that it did not 
believe “ancillary benefits of rooftop solar…which include 
commodity price mitigation, grid security, and economic 
development, would provide any significant value (if any at all) in 
reducing utility costs or in mitigating the cost shift that results from 
net metering.”134 Two months after that, APS categorically denied 
any sort of benefits of rooftop solar over large-scale solar facilities, 
asking “why should APS customers pay more for energy produced 
by rooftop solar than for energy produced by utility-scale solar 
facilities . . . ?”135 
These arguments lost their forcefulness, however, when on July 
28th, 2014, APS filed a proposal with the ACC asking for permission 
to develop 20 MW of solar PV systems on 3,000 rooftops in the state 
of Arizona through the end of 2015.136 APS announced it was 
proposing the 20 MW utility-owned residential DG program in 
“respon[se] to clear customer interest.”137 Under this program, APS 
would “install the DG on customer rooftops and on the utility side of 
the meter,” renting these rooftops for 20 years in exchange for a 30 
dollar per month bill credit.138 If approved, this program would render 
net metering concerns for those customers taking part in the program 
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moot. According to the proposal “AZ Sun DG customers would not 
take net metering service,” though they would “continue taking 
service under any rate for which they would otherwise be eligible.”139 
APS would also “competitively select local solar installers to build 
AZ Sun DG” to deploy these systems, “strategically deploy[ing] a 
portion of the 3,000 systems to pursue specific purposes, such as 
serving low income or low credit score customers and providing 
system benefits.”140 Additionally, APS would orient these systems to 
“maximize the amount of solar production during system peak 
periods” and install advanced inverters to “provide flexibility to 
manage power quality and lay the foundation for better integrating 
rooftop solar with the distribution system.”141 
Many solar advocates and national solar companies are crying 
foul over APS’s solar rooftop proposal, complaining it is nothing 
more than a ploy to strengthen APS’s stranglehold on Arizona’s 
power industry. “The irony here is that APS has spent two years 
complaining about how terrible solar is [and] how it’s a massive 
problem for the grid. But now they are saying it’s fine, as long as they 
can control it entirely,” complained a spokesman for the Alliance for 
Solar Choice, an advocacy group representing solar service 
companies.142 He has a point: Even while touting its contribution to 
the overall industry by setting aside projects for local installers, 
should the proposal be passed, APS would be controlling its former 
competitors. 
Regardless, APS’s plan addresses many of the concerns that come 
with the expansion of DG while preserving many of its benefits. First, 
it contributes to achieving Arizona’s Renewable Energy Standard 
(RES) of 15% by 2025, with 30% of the total to be derived from 
distributed energy technologies.143 The proposal enhances APS’s 
ability to target and control installation while keeping upgrade costs 
down, allowing APS to position DG assets in places with the greatest 
benefit to the grid.144 If approved, APS will gain expertise in both 
installation and maintenance of these systems while benefiting from 
the ability to buy DG equipment in bulk. Moreover, because of APS’s 
large balance sheets, thanks to its T&D assets, APS will be able to tap 
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into low-cost capital to finance the expansion.145 The proposal also 
neutralizes many of APS’s previous opponents; many local installers 
initially opposed to APS’s efforts are now eligible to bid on the 
proposed solar installations.146 Nonetheless, national solar companies 
assert APS’s proposal would ultimately quash competition in the state 
because it is the incumbent utility, rather than the consumer, making 
the choice. 
A primary concern for third parties competing with an incumbent 
utility like APS is the regulatory structure that facilitates the utility’s 
ability to make authorized rate of return on its DG investment. Ken 
Johnson, a Solar Energy Industries Association (SEIA) spokesman 
observed, “This latest tactic by APS has a ‘Trojan horse’ smell to it. 
Our member companies welcome fair and equal competition, but this 
move would stack the deck in favor of a company which can rate-
base solar with a guaranteed rate of return. How is that fair?”147 This 
is in addition to the built-in advantage of name recognition and 
existing connections with customers that incumbent utilities already 
have over third party competitors.148 
VI. LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD 
If incumbent utilities are allowed to directly compete with third 
parties, unfair competitive advantages on both sides would have to be 
addressed. How would third parties be able to match the name 
recognition and access utilities already have with their customers? Is 
it fair that utilities have to seek PUC approval before every change in 
their business models, even those that may lower overall costs for 
their consumers? 
Ostensibly, the purpose of competition is to provide a better 
product to consumers while lowering costs and increasing 
innovation. Before utilities could compete with non-utility service 
providers, they would need the flexibility to adjust their service 
offerings with more ease and frequency, which in turn would require 
a more flexible relationship with regulators.149 Though recent 
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innovations such as energy efficiency and environmental regulations 
have been compatible with the current regulatory structure, DER is a 
fundamentally different paradigm; “They are forcing the creation of 
a new market that the current regulatory system is not optimized 
for,” said Joseph Scalise of Bain and Company, a global 
management-consulting firm.150 Until the regulatory structure is able 
to catch up, it is reasonable to provide utilities more leeway in 
optimizing their DG offerings to their consumers. This flexibility 
could be achieved by allowing utilities more latitude in configuring 
systems and pricing for their DG systems, at least until those 
systems comprise a certain percentage of the market. 
Utilities already have the burden of planning for future power 
needs and upgrades through the IRP process; they know where 
infrastructure will need replacement, where neighborhoods are 
expanding, and where DG implementation would have the greatest 
benefit. As part of this process, utilities must set-aside a certain 
percentage of power generation for renewables. For example, under 
Minnesota law, utilities are required to include “the least cost plan for 
meeting 50 and 75% of all new and refurbished capacity needs 
through a combination of conservation and renewable energy 
resources.”151 In a similar manner, incumbent utilities could be 
required to file an IRP with a certain percentage of generating 
capacity reserved for DG, allotting a certain percentage of generation 
to third party providers. Both figures would be set by the PUC, and 
would be a floor rather than a ceiling. Utilities could also be given 
rate incentives for reducing overall expenses through the strategic use 
of DG. As part of this process utilities would be required to provide 
access to information on customers and planned growth and upgrades 
to non-utility competitors. 
Mandating that third parties provide a certain threshold 
percentage of all renewable DG in the state could allay concerns 
by utilities about unfair competitive advantage. For instance, if 
50% of all new power needs must be supplied by renewable 
energy, then at least 25% of those renewable energy sources must 
be provided by third party contractors. This would be a floor, not a 
ceiling; if more than 25% of consumers chose third party providers 
over the incumbent, there would be no cap. Similarly, if less than 
25% of consumers chose the third party, the utility would have to 
contract out the remainder among third parties. Therefore, utilities 
would still have an incentive to compete while ensuring more fair 
competition for new entrants. 
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At the same time, there are a number of strategies that can level 
the playing field for third parties competing against incumbents. For 
example, the low-cost capital advantage of utilities can be mitigated 
with a separate low-interest loan program established exclusively for 
third party installers. Minnesota’s Agricultural and Economic 
Development Board administers the Small Business Development 
Loan Program, providing up to $5 million for any one business with 
20% of project costs privately financed through equity or other 
sources.152 A similar program could be created for third-party solar 
installers, along with incentives such as tax breaks. Alternatively, 
the utility incumbents could provide financing to third parties as a 
method to meet their RPS goals, or purchase their services outright. 
Name recognition and relationships between incumbent utilities 
and their customers are harder to mitigate. Just as it took many years 
for people to recognize “Virgin Mobile” as readily as “AT&T,” such 
recognition takes time. This transition can be facilitated by utilities 
providing on-bill comparisons between themselves and third-party 
providers. Additionally, the PUC can provide a 
webpage/clearinghouse for rate and financing comparisons, such as 
the one used by the Texas PUC.153 A similar clearinghouse can be 
established for third party providers with customer information and 
planned construction, so all parties have access to the same 
information. 
Ultimately, the advantage of having the incumbent utility compete 
in the market rather than merely providing information and incentives 
to third parties comes down to a matter of orderly expansion and 
boosting the overall demand for renewable DG. The advantages 
enjoyed by the utility over third parties, such as name recognition, 
trust, customer service, and billing experience, are the same ones that 
allow it to make renewable DG attractive to customers who would not 
otherwise choose to do so. Without incumbent utility participation, it 
will likely take longer for renewable DG to reach a critical mass as 
third parties attempt to target those consumers willing to give up the 
certainty and reliability of the provider they have known for years in 
exchange for incentives that may or may not be appealing. 
Ultimately, it will be up to the legislature to decide whether it favors 
competition with a longer timeline for DG adoption or reliability and 
predictability with incumbent participation as a partner in DG 
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development. The alternative is having the incumbent utility be an 
unwilling and resentful facilitator forced to participate in its own 
untimely death through the stick of regulation. 
CONCLUSION 
Though concerns over the utility’s unfair competitive advantage 
are noteworthy, they are not enough to overcome the certain 
advantages that will be offered when the utility throws its resources 
and experience behind DG. Allowing incumbent utilities to compete 
in the renewable DG market will encourage adoption and investment 
in DER, which in turn will accelerate benefits such as carbon 
mitigation, lowered fuel costs, and grid stability. In addition to 
benefiting the consumer, the utility, and installers, permitting such 
competition would encourage innovation, provided the utility is given 
both the flexibility and incentive to do so. 
While utilities occupy a strong position within their exclusive 
territories in terms of competitive advantage, this will likely erode 
over time as third parties and new technologies offer consumers other 
options.154 Allowing utilities in the marketplace will ease the 
transition to DG by giving consumers the option of keeping the 
provider they think of as being reliable and familiar while moving 
towards a new paradigm of power generation and distribution. 
Information sharing and low-interest financing could ensure 
fairness and decrease overall costs for competitors and consumers. 
Meanwhile, set-asides can nurture the industry in its infancy like net 
metering before it by attracting third-party competitors and investors, 
which in turn can attract employment opportunities for Minnesotans. 
Just like the example of deregulation forcing utilities to think 
critically about how to attract and retain customers by offering “green 
power,” so too can competition in the renewable DG/DER market 
encourage innovation and enhance customer service. 
The durability of the incumbent utility business model, combined 
with the inexorable rise of renewable DG technology, means it is both 
necessary and beneficial to start incorporating incumbents into the 
DER market as soon as possible. The most efficient way to do this is 
to take advantage of the profit motive by allowing utilities to compete 
in providing DER solutions while retaining the current options for 
customers to install DER using a third party. By combining 
reasonable constraints on the competitive advantage, transparency of 
information for the consumer and competitors, and flexibility to 
innovate, stakeholders can ensure a smooth transition while lowering 
costs and increasing choice. In this manner, both incumbents and third 
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parties can meet the regulatory and aspirational goals of making 
Minnesota a leader in providing green energy at reasonable prices 
while ensuring reliability and sustainability. 
  
 
 
